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ABSTRACT
A number of approaches to meaning have suffered from not taking 
into account all levels and aspects of meaning. The attempt is 
made here to relate together all the different types of meaning, 
linguistic and non-linguistic, and to show as well the relevance 
of such elements as the situational or pragmatic matrix and the 
fact that language is a dynamism, a process, not a static entity. 
The purpose of the paper, therefore, is to create an awareness of 
the complexities and problems that have to be faced when linguists 
deal with linguistic meaning.
1. Introduction
There are three fundamentally different aspects of meaning that 
must be distinguished if we are to make a comprehensive analysis 
of the meaning of language, and if we are to distinguish the proper 
role that language plays in human affairs. These three types are 
(1) information (or universal meaning), (2) referential meaning, 
which involves both language and the world of experience, and (3) 
meaning that is specific to language.
1.1 Information
Information is a level of meaning that is independent of 
language, but may be incorporated into language, and should therefore 
be described as pre-linguistic. If we define meaning as a 
relationship, whether natural or arbitrary, between two elements, 
one of which is a sign of the other, we may observe that, in the 
world of experience, smoke means fire: smoke is a sign of fire. 
Or, alternatively, sunset means the coming of night. The 
relationships upon which the conveying of information depends are, 
in fact, equational, in the sense that if we are given X, we may 
expect Y. That all meaning involves this kind of relationship has 
been the linguistic tradition from the treatises on the modus 
significandi of the Medieval grammarians to those of the present 
day: Saussure (1916:97ff) used the terms signifiant (morpheme) and
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signifié (sememe); Ogden and Richards (1923:11), with a quite 
different metaphysical bias, used symbol and referent : Hjelmslev 
(1935:xii) uses expression and content : Ullmann (1957:70) tries 
commonsense forms like name and sense : Lyons (1981:19) uses form 
and meaning. In all of these pairs the first element is the sign, 
the second is that which is signified.
In this way, if we return to information theory, X becomes the 
sign of Y and becomes capable of inducing a response of expectancy 
in an observer. If the expectancy is continuously induced in this 
way, the observer may in fact develop a conditioned reflex: either 
a positive reflex (if the expectancy is significant or important, 
e.g. a red traffic light) or a negative reflex to ignore (if the 
expectancy is trivial, e.g. the red light that indicates that the 
radio is in stereo mode).
Information in any channel is, of course, a function of 
improbability. If it is probable that the sign (or stimulus) 
indicates a trivial or insignificant expectancy, the observer will 
ignore it. If, on the other hand, it is improbable that the 
expectancy is trivial, the observer will tend to take note of it.
Consequently, many different observers, regardless of language, 
may observe a situation and draw similar conclusions from it because 
of their knowledge and experience of the world. And indeed, the 
higher animals, both wild and tame, interpret a great range of 
facts as being 'significant,' as having a meaningful relationship 
with other facts. All animals, it would seem, are capable of 
deriving information from observed movement: the slightest movement 
of a figure upon a background will attract the attention of an 
animal, and many animals have learned to escape observation by 
'freezing,' by standing stock still.
It is well known, in fact, that information is conveyed by 
observed differences. Any item that differs or changes from the 
observed or the expected is a potential conveyor of information to 
the observer. Consequently, in information theory considerable 
importance is attached to the notion of redundancy: what is 
redundant is that which does not change in the channel of 
communication and consequently carries no charge of information, 
since information is contingent upon that which is different (Cherry 
1964) .
Much information is therefore of a 'negentropic' kind. Since 
entropy is the natural tendency of the universe towards a stable, 
formless state, negentropy is the converse: the featured 
informational forms that distinguish discrete elements of the 
universe from formless matter (Black 1969) . Black, although
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primarily concerned with the biological forms that are important 
and meaningful in medecine and microbiology, gives, as one of his 
most interesting examples of negentropy, the metal key that opens 
a door, a prime example of encoded information.
Necessarily, much of the pre-linguistic information of the 
universe also finds itself incorporated in some way into language. 
A swift survey of animal species impresses with the binarity of 
their structure and design: two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, two 
wings (or arms), two horns: one side of the body being a mirror 
image of the other. It would be difficult to imagine a language 
which did not have a word signifying two or duality; and languages 
are rich in all kinds of binary categories and binary structures. 
Where language entities closely reflect the structure of experience, 
we speak of the iconicitv of language, and there is interesting 
recent work on this very topic, well illustrated in Haiman 1985, for 
example.
1.2 Referential Meaning
Referential meaning is, consequently, the interface between the 
prelinguistic. information of the universe, which is universal to 
all human beings, and the language specific concepts that are the 
typical constructs of natural languages. If we observe a tree in 
a field, for example, there is no doubt that the sense-datum is 
the same for all humanity. As Hjelmslev shows us (1969:54), the 
tree in the field is trae in Danish, Baum in German, arbre in French, 
tree in English. When it is chopped down, however, it is still 
trae in Danish, but Holz in German, bois in French, wood in English. 
Bois and wood can also be used for a group of trees, but in German 
this is already Wald. which is also used where French and English 
use foret/forest. Danish, meanwhile, uses skov for any group of 
trees, large or small, but this word may not be used for trees 
that are harvested, as is the case with Holz. bois. wood.
Referential meaning is therefore the exploitation of quite 
different linguistic conceptions to refer to the same experiential 
reality. The blade of a knife, a lawn-mower, a razor, a shears, 
or other cutting tool, is in French une lame. But the blade of a 
camera shutter, a fan, a mixer or a propeller is une pale or une 
palette; the blade of a turbine, on the other hand, is une aube 
(also the vane of a windmill and the paddle of a paddle steamer), 
the blade of a windshield wiper une raclette. of a guillotine le 
couperet, of a tongue or an oar le plat, of a plane (carpenter's 
tool) or a spade le fer. of a set-square la tige. of grass un brin. 
and of cereals une pousse. An anglophone, therefore, would refer
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to all of these entities using the English word (and necessarily 
the English concept) blade: a francophone, referring to the same 
experiential entities, uses a variety of words and concepts. Both 
speakers are referring to the same informational material of the 
experiential universe, but speaking different languages, both utilize 
quite different conceptual materials in making these references. 
The French word fer, for example, used for the blade of a plane or 
a spade, is also used for axe-heads, punches, horseshoes, and 
flatirons; here is a concept that is obviously very different from 
that of English blade. But if I present a spade to an anglophone 
and a francophone, and ask them both to refer to the blade, there 
is no doubt that what is referred to, the sense-datum, is identical 
in both cases, even if it is apprehended in culturally different 
modes.
1.3 Linguistic Meaning
Those who speak only one language are sometimes unaware that 
there is a fundamental difference between linguistic meaning and 
universal meaning (i.e. the pre-linguistic meaning inherent in the 
negentropy of the universe); indeed there is a well-known tendency, 
commented upon by Ogden and Richards (1923:2), to confuse word and 
thing. An examination of meaning differences between two languages 
quickly reveals, however, that linguistic meaning, no matter how 
close it may sometimes parallel universal informational meaning, is 
nevertheless always language specific. As Sapir puts it (1921:14) 
'...the typical linguistic element labels a concept.'
Even bilinguals or multilinguals, if they speak only 
Indo-European languages, may be under the illusion that siblings 
are always classified as to their sex: brother is a male sibling 
and sister a female sibling. But some language families discriminate 
age rather than sex, so that the Cree word nisim means my younger 
sibling. and there are no separate words in Cree for younger brother. 
younger sister. Or alternatively the discrimination may be same 
sex vs. opposite sex. Melanesian pidgin, for example, borrowed 
the words brother and sister from English, but then proceeded to 
use them in terms of the native culture, so that Melanesian brata 
means sibling of the same sex, and sisa means sibling of the opposite 
sex: a boy, for example, will call his brother brata and his sister 
sisa. but a girl will call her sister brata. and her brother sisa.
We cannot hope to avoid confusion, therefore, if we do not 
distinguish between linguistic meaning, which is the relationship 
between a language specific sign and its language specific 
significate on the one hand, and the use of this combined
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sign-significate on the other hand to refer, as occasion may arise, 
to the information inherent in the world of experience.
Even words that appear at first sight to have identical 
linguistic meaning normally turn out to be significantly different 
in some small way. The French word porte and the English word 
door. for example, are two different signs, each with different 
lexical content, as the dictionary shows us: the door of a vehicle 
is portiere. whereas porte is used of the gate of a city, which 
for speakers of English is not a door at all. If someone asks
1. Will you open the garage door?
they might equally say to someone who also understands French
2. Veux-tu ouvrir la porte du garage?
The door referred to in the real world (the external referent) 
would be identical in both sentences, but the notions underlying 
porte and door are different because the French notion includes 
the gates of cities whereas the English notion includes the doors 
of vehicles.
2. Language Specific Meaning
2.1 Permanent and Contextual Meaning
But, it may be justifiably objected, in the sentences in 
question there is no reference to car doors or city gates, and it 
is a fundamental fact of language that the same word will mean 
different things in different sentences. This observation may 
well lead to the old squabble over permanent and contextual meaning. 
In this quarrel one side (e.g. Stern 1931:31ff) claims that a word 
has a permanent meaning, and that dictionaries are statements of such 
permanent meanings. The other side, claiming with Ogden and Richards 
that 'words, as everyone now knows, mean nothing by themselves' 
(1923:10), asserts that words only have meaning when placed in 
context. The contextualists, as I shall call them, would undoubtedly 
take arms against my term 'underlying meaning,' and would probably 
claim that there is no such entity. The supporters of permanent 
meaning, however, are defending the sememe or underlying significate, 
whereas the contextualists are defending a different entity, the 
alloseme or surface significate. The result is that in their 
arguments the two sides are not even talking about the same objective 
reality. The same kind of confusion would arise in phonology if 
one failed to distinguish between underlying phoneme and surface
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allophone. It is surprising, therefore, that there are linguists 
who, while insisting on the necessity and importance of 
distinguishing between phoneme and allophone, would reject any 
kind of underlying meaning, and specifically reject the sememe, as 
does Bazell (1954).
There is, in fact, a positivist or anti-mentalist tradition 
that runs from Malinowski (1923), Ogden and Richards (1923) through 
Firth (1935) to present day writers such as Lyons (1968, 1978, 
1981), although Lyons prefers to hedge and ask questions rather 
than state the position categorically:
Shall we say that the meaning of such words as 
truth, beauty and goodness is the 'concept' or 
'idea' associated with them in the 'minds' of 
those who know the language to which the words 
belong - and, in general, that 'meanings' are 
'concepts' or 'ideas'? If we say this, we shall 
find ourselves once again in the midst of 
philosophical, and psychological, controversy.
For many philosophers and psychologists are 
extremely dubious about the existence of 
'concepts,' or indeed of the 'mind'. (Lyons 
1968:401).
This passage regrettably suggests that we should give a greater 
weight and importance to the metaphysical beliefs of certain 
philosophers and psychologists than to our own rational discussion 
as linguists. Opinion has fluctuated somewhat on this issue over 
the last twenty years, but Lyons is still adamant that an 
'ideational, or mentalistic' theory of meaning is unsatisfactory 
(1981:31) . It will be my contention here that no sensible discussion 
of meaning can ignore either the sememe (Lyons' 'concept') or the 
alloseme, and that the two must be reconciled within the bounds of 
a single coherent explanation.
2.2 The Nature of Underlying Elements
Any analysis of language that does not make some kind of 
distinction between -emic and -etic entities is headed for 
unnecessary trouble and confusion. That is essentially what the 
Saussurean and neo-Saussurean dichotomy of langue (tongue) and 
parole (discourse) is all about: the -emic entities are all elements 
of langue. the fundamental contrasts of the tongue we learned as 
children, permanently stored in the subconscious mind. The -etic 
entities, on the other hand, are elements of parole. they describe
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the infinite variation that is found in discourse, which is 
exteriorised, conscious, and momentary - what is said is normally 
lost on the air waves in a matter of seconds. The -etic elements, 
as items of discourse, are normally elements of such momentary 
sentences, whereas the phoneme, the morpheme and the sememe are 
all permanent elements of tongue, elements of systems, stored in 
the subconscious mind, out of awareness. We may even say stored 
in the somatic mind, to use Black's term (1969): the somatic mind 
(Greek scma = body) is a permanent part of the total physiological 
person, since its functioning (such as the production of spastic 
vowel sounds) can be triggered by the touch of the neurosurgeon's 
electrode on the surface of the cortex, as Penfield has shown 
(Penfield & Roberts 1959:199). The mental effects, such as memory 
replay, that were triggered by the touch of Penfield's electrode 
demonstrate the absurdity of the assumptions of positivist 
philosophers and old-fashioned behaviorist psychologists, who 
believe, according to .true Cartesian orthodoxy, that what is 
described as mental is 'non-physical' and consequently has no 
empirical reality whatever.
It is more than three centuries since Descartes created this 
dualism between the res extensa (physical) and the res cogitans 
(mental), each one completely independent of the other, in his 
view. This unacceptable dualism in turn leads to arguments between 
'empiricists' and 'rationalists' that are self-defeating because 
the two sides simply have hold of different ends of the same stick, 
each one concentrating on one aspect of the phenomenon, and neither 
side taking a holistic or global view. A true twentieth century 
view, in the Einsteinian tradition (space and time are not separate 
entities, but different aspects of the space/time continuum) would 
see mental organization (Descartes' res cogitans) and physical 
existence (Descartes res extensa) as indivisible aspects of all 
experiential reality. Belief in the 'non-physical' status of the 
mind, in fact, is totally refuted by the experiments of 
Penfield: such beliefs ultimately have nothing whatever to do with 
science, since science is not a philosophical or metaphysical 
position, but a fundamental way of proceeding in coherent and 
rational fashion.
The -emic entities, however, the elements of langue. being 
stored in the subconscious mind or somatic mind, out of awareness, 
are not amenable to direct observation, but only to indirect 
observation; they must be worked out by persistent and careful 
analysis, in much the same way that the historical linguist works 
out the data of (unobservable) prehistoric protolanguages. A 
phonological system, for example, can never be observed directly 
(if it could, there would be no need to train linguists), but has 
to be worked out from observation of the function and deportment
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of the directly observable allophones in the stream of speech. 
The -emic entities are therefore theoretical, and the -etic entities 
empirical. As in all science the theoretical constructs are based 
upon the empirical data, and are justified or disproved on the 
basis of empirical evidence.
In sound theoretical method, therefore, the underlying 
theoretical substructures are a reconstruction of that part of the 
reality that is not directly observable, and consequently not 
amenable to empirical investigation and description. The application 
of sound theoretical method to linguistics requires that theoretical 
constructs be a reasonable reflection or model of the underlying, 
unobservable aspect of the phenomenon.
2.3 The Observation of Meaning
What part of linguistic meaning is amenable to empirical 
description, and what part must be reconstructed by sound theoretical 
method? If we listen to someone speaking a completely unfamiliar 
language, all that we are capable of observing is the phonic string 
that vibrates on the air waves. We are not capable of observing 
what such speakers mean when they speak. Because we hav6 never 
learned the underlying tongue (langue) that these speakers are 
utilizing, we do not have the appropriate medium of observation, 
and are therefore not in a position to observe what they are saying. 
We are like the microbiologist caught without a microscope: we do 
not have the requisite means for observing. But when people use a 
tongue that we have learned, we have the necessary medium for 
observing what they mean when they speak. This fact has always 
been implicitly accepted by linguists, who have always either asked 
native speakers about the meanings of sentences, or, as native 
speakers themselves, have never hesitated to give their own 
interpretations of sentences in the mother tongue. But linguists 
have sometimes been unwilling to accept the fact that meaning is 
observable at the level of discourse, at the level of parole. because 
such observation can only be carried out by introspection. Yet even 
those who have objected explicitly to the use of introspection 
(e.g. Twaddell 1935, 1966:57) would not hesitate to ask a native 
speaker whether two different sentences were alike or different in 
meaning, apparently unaware that it is only by means of introspection 
that the native speaker could answer such a question.
As speakers of English, however, we are all aware, by 
introspection, that the openings in the walls of a city are called 
gates not doors. If there is a consensus of agreement among speakers 
about such items, there is no reason why the results of introspection
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should not be just as respectable as the product of other forms of 
observation. The proviso however is an important one: that there 
should be a consensus of at least two (and preferably more) speakers. 
And equally important: introspection is limited to the level of 
discourse, of what is actually said or used, because introspection 
is valid only for the cerebral or conscious mind. No amount of 
introspection will ever enable a native speaker to observe the 
underlying -emic entities, because such entities belong to the 
somatic or subconscious mind which is not normally accessible to 
awareness, to consciousness, and therefore not amenable to 
introspection.
Any attempted use of introspection to determine underlying 
categories, therefore, is necessarily purely speculative. Such 
underlying categories being quite simply unobservable, they can 
only be determined by the examination of the data of discourse, 
and by the correct application of theoretical method to such data. 
We must observe how words are used in order to reconstruct their 
underlying meanings.
2.4 The Reconstruction of Underlying Meaning
From the directly observable (or -etic) entities of discourse 
(i.e. of parole’) . the theoretical (or -emic) entities of tongue 
(i.e. of langue) must be reconstructed. Traditionally, for example, 
linguists have carefully and meticulously sifted through phonetic 
transcriptions in order to elaborate the phonemic inventory of a 
language.
In like fashion, from the information available on the use of 
lexical and grammatical items in discourse, we may reconstruct 
underlying significates, or sememes, which will explain or justify 
the varying and different allosemes to be found in discourse. 
This work has so far received much less attention from linguists 
than comparable studies in other aspects of linguistics.
Such neglect stems at least in part from linguists' attitudes 
towards the sememe. Bloomfield (1933:140,168), for example, 
considered that it was principally the task of other sciences to 
define sememes. Other linguists, while prepared to accept the 
phoneme-allophone distinction, steadfastly refused to believe that 
a morph had any underlying meaning or sememe: Lyons, for example, 
declares (1968:412,428) that it is unnecessary and undesirable 'to 
postulate the existence of independently defined senses.' Still 
others (e.g. Fries 1954:65) believed that meaning lay in the overt 
behaviour or current response that consistently followed any speech
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act, or in the referent (e.g. Ogden and Richards 1923:10), the 
object named. (Presumably if there was no referent or ensuing overt 
behaviour, what was said was meaningless).
Several linguists have, however, distinguished the two levels 
of linguistic meaning. Jakobson's Gesamtbedeutung (1936,1966:51-57) 
is an underlying meaning different from the surface meanings because 
it is a reconstruction (which is why Jakobson refuses such terms 
as Grundbedeutung 'basic meaning' and Hauptbedeutung 'principal 
meaning' - these are nothing more than major allosemes). Hjelmslev 
even earlier than Jakobson states (1935:37): 'La conception ou 
l'idée qu'il s'agit de chercher dans une forme linguistique doit 
être une idée une, une seule signification fondamentale ... d'un 
degré d'abstraction assez grand pour permettre d'en déduire tous 
les emplois concrets de la forme.' Guillaume distinguishes the 
underlying signifié de puissance from the surface signifiés d'effet, 
and states (1971:87) that the former must be reconstructed from 
the latter. Ullmann (1957) distinguishes meaning in langue from 
meaning in parole (what he calls meaning vs. sense). Joos (1964) 
distinguishes the additive meaning of a lexical unit from its 
privative meaning: a word used in discourse brings its own additive 
contribution (= sememe) to the sentence, and is then subjected to 
the privative contribution of all the other units of the sentence 
to produce the alloseme, which like the allophone, is contextual.
The notion of a single global meaning underlying all the 
contextual meanings, however, is not one that has gone unchallenged. 
Guillaume himself, in a most interesting passage (1971:78) , observes 
that his own teacher Meillet was for long years opposed to this 
view, and had originally held (as did Ogden and Richards: see quote 
in 2.1 above) that a form meant nothing by itself and had 'no other 
sense than that which it received from its usage.' Guillaume notes 
that this opinion is justified in so far as it eliminates the 
erroneous practice of taking one of the surface meanings (e.g. a 
Hauptbedeutung. obtained by introspection) as being the basic 
underlying meaning, but is ultimately untenable since it also rules 
out the appropriate theoretical reconstruction of the necessary 
underlying significate.
It is obvious, for example, that all the surface meanings of 
any one form are limited to a range. If I say 'I fixed the board' 
that may mean that I tampered with the scoreboard, that I repaired 
the loose plank, or even that I adjusted the sound panel, but (and 
this is what makes the above opinion untenable) it does not, and 
normally cannot mean I ate the sausage or I chased the cat. In 
other words, it is a necessary conclusion that in the sentence I 
fixed the board the various surface meanings of the noun board are 
conditioned by an underlying meaning that circumscribes the range
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of possibilities beyond which the surface meanings cannot go. 
Without this underlying meaning that conditions or circumscribes 
the surface meanings, discourse would be incoherent, would be chaos. 
As Guillaume put it (1964:247-8): if a sign before it is used
carries no potential significate, it is a sign without a usable 
meaning.' It is not surprising that Meillet, for all his positivist 
leanings, changed his mind on the question of underlying meanings 
(Guillaume 1971:78).
2.5 The Techniques of Reconstruction
A pianist who has not seen the score of a piece of music for • 
a long time may have forgotten even what key the music is written 
in. But if he is still able to play the piece, if it is preserved 
in the subconscious motor memory, he can, by observing his own 
performance, reconstruct the score, with key signatures, bars, 
notes, etc. The key to reconstructing the underlying entities of 
a language consists likewise in careful observation of performance. 
As far as concerns linguistic meaning, it is important to observe 
especially the behaviour of linguistic elements themselves, so the 
the limits of their usage may be observed and the range of usage, 
which is restricted by the underlying conditioning sememe, thereby 
determined. The sememe itself, though subconscious and not directly 
observable, may be traced through its allosemes, through the patterns 
of its usage. As Wittgenstein suggested (1953:14, 53, etc.), for 
a somewhat different purpose, we should not look for the meaning of 
a word but for its use. Having done that we are then in a position 
to propose a theoretical underlying meaning, thereby carrying out 
an operation that is a fundamental modus operand! in both synchronic 
and diachronic lingistics, as in the elaboration of phonemes from 
a purely phonetic script or in the reconstruction of protoforms 
from the cognates found in dáughter languages - in both cases 
theoretical underlying forms are proposed that are capable of 
conditioning the surface, observable data.
3. Meaning and Process
3.1 Meaning as a Productive Process
Language usage (langage in Saussure's terms) is a process, an 
activity, not a Ding-an-sich, not a static entity. It is only in 
terms of process that time (as movement across space) may be related 
to space (within the perspective of the space/time continuum); that 
mind may be related to the physiological brain; that discourse
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(linguistic activity) may be related to a specific tongue. 
Consequently, any coherent description or theory of language must 
be in some sense generative, that is, must indicate movement, 
activity or process from one stage or state to another. Speaking 
is necessarily an activity whereby the underlying elements of a 
tongue are processed, albeit subconsciously, for use in discourse. 
This is not a new idea, of course; Sapir entitled the fourth chapter 
of his 1921 monograph Form in Language: Grammatical Processes. In 
English, for example, a basic significate may be processed as 
different parts of speech: the notion round can be made into a 
noun, verb, adverb, adjective, or preposition. If made into a 
noun it will be singular or plural; as a verb it will be processed 
for mood, tense, etc.:
3. They ordered several rounds of drinks.
4. He rounded the corner at a gallop.
5. At the round earth's imagined corners blow/ Your trumpets,
angels.
6. Running round and round in circles.
7. He lives round the corner.
Surface meaning is also the product of processing. From the 
range of meaning available in a given underlying significate or 
sememe, the requirements of linguistic context and pragmatic 
situation will eliminate all factors except those appropriate to 
the situational context. Or, in Joos's terms, from the total of 
the additive meaning of a term, the privative meaning of the other 
terms will strip away all factors except those appropriate to the 
sentence. The end product is an alloseme or actual significate. 
In a sentence such as
8. A car door should be hinged at the front.
the context indicates that a special kind of door is meant, a kind 
of door that is not part of the meaning of French porte. but is 
part of the meaning of English door.
3.2 Generating Surface Structures
Two surface allosemes cannot be generated at one and the same 
time from a single underlying sememe: even with puns one has a choice
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between two alternating variants, between two possibilities. It 
is possible to say:
9. The book is sad.
10. John is sad.
but as McCawley (1967:126) points out it is not possible to say:
11. John is as sad as the book he read last year.
because the word sad, when applied to books and people has at least 
two different senses: 'producing sadness' and 'feeling sadness.' 
McCawley consequently proceeds to place two different lexical items 
in the deep structures, but, whatever one thinks of deep stfuctures, 
this is a methodological error because surface meaning is allosemic 
and endlessly various, and consequently McCawley's two lexical 
items cannot account for such expressions as a 'sad look' or a 
'sad case,' which would seem to warrant two further entries in the 
deep structure. If every different surface alloseme required a 
new item in the lexicon, the lexicon would be infinite, because 
surface meaning is infinitely varied.
Many of the different aspects of meaning may be seen as 
belonging to different 'moments' or levels of the generative act, 
to the underlying or surface levels, and I shall here endeavour to 
present an account that aims to be a model for a speaker, who 
creates, from the underlying apparatus available to him or her, the 
variation that we observe at the surface level.
3.3 The Generative Act
Let us presume, for simplicity of presentation, that the speaker 
has observed some items of information from the world of experience 
that he or she wishes to express: the appearance of a cat in the 
garden, for example. In order to process this item of information 
through the medium of language, a search would be required for 
suitable underlying significates that may be appropriately fitted 
together to form a coherent representation. The moving figure 
(cat) and the external ground against which it moves (garden), 
both of which are fundamental informational elements, may be expected 
to be processed by all languages, each element being represented 
by being allocated to a language specific sememe, which thereupon 
will be processed grammatically to relate appropriately to the 
other elements in the final collocation. Once this grammatical 
processing has taken place, the resultant grammaticalized sememe
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(Saussure's signifié1) will have an automatic reflex: a sign (called 
signifiant by Saussure, in defiance of normal usage). The reflex 
nature of this sememe-sign relationship is demonstrated by the 
researches of (Penfield and Roberts 1959:227):
When the electrode was applied to point 26 ... on 
the anterior speech area, the patient was being shown a 
picture of a human foot. He said, 'Oh, I know what it 
is. That is what you put in your shoes. ' After the 
electrode was withdrawn, he said 'foot.'
When the electrode was applied to the supramarginal 
gyrus at 27, he said, 'I know what it is' and was silent.
When the electrode was withdrawn, he said at once, 'tree, ' 
which was correct.
When the electrode was applied to the posterior 
temporal region at 28 he was completely silent. A little 
time after the electrode was withdrawn, he exclaimed 
suddenly, 'Now I can talk - butterfly [which was correct] .
I couldn't get that word "butterfly," and then I tried 
to get the word "moth".'
This demonstrates that there is a neuronal mechanism 
for speech in the dominant hemisphere that can be 
inactivated completely, or imcompletely, by electrical 
discharge.
In a language such as English, for example, the underlying 
sememe of cross. when grammaticalized, has such reflex signs as 
cross. crosses. crossing. crossed, where the morphology itself 
clearly reflects (i.e. is a symptom of) the grammatical processing, 
which is itself meaningful, or semantic, as may be demonstrated by 
minimal pairs: I saw him cross the road/ crossing the road.
What is true of English is equally true of other types of 
language except that the basic notion may be grammaticalized as a 
root, or as a post-base, or as an incorporation of the verb rather 
than a separate part of speech. Each such distinctive 
grammaticalization may well result in a distinctively different 
reflex sign, which will normally show morphophonemic relationships 
to the other signs of the set. This is not an absolute requirement, 
of course, and in verbs of going there is typically suppletion in 
Indo-European languages: French has pres, i e vais. impf. i'allais. 
fut. i'irai. and even in English the reflex sign for the notional 
content (go + past tense) is went.
We know almost nothing of the psychological reality of the 
syntactic organization at this level, but we can see from Penfield's 
discussion of his experiments (Penfield and Roberts 1959:227-233) 
that every underlying (linguistic) significate will automatically
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release its reflex sign, unless the reflex is blocked by an 
electrical discharge, or disturbed by aphasia. The sign may be 
either interiorized (in silence) or exteriorized, in which case it 
will be given phonic shape and be caused to vibrate on the air 
waves, and received by the hearer. The hearer, if he knows the 
sense of the underlying significate, will normally be able to deduce 
the surface meaning intended by the speaker by taking into account 
the effect of context and situation upon this underlying significate. 
There are three steps in the process therefore: Step One is the 
choice of underlying significate or sememe, which when 
grammaticalized will automatically release Step Two, which is the 
sign. Releasing the sign into the stream of speech induces the 
conditioned surface significate or alloseme, which is Step Three:
Sememe....-..... > Sign---------- > Alloseme
3.4 An Operational Analogy of the Generative Act
A helpful analogy is that of the child's Meccano set or 
construction set. Each set consists of a variety of parts, that 
may be fitted together in a variety of ways, some of the parts 
(such as nuts and bolts) being used only for connectors for fitting 
the major parts together. A child wishing to make a model airplane 
with the set will take pieces from the set and incorporate them 
into the model. The set corresponds to tongue, but the airplane 
and other such models constructed correspond to discourse, to the 
sentences constructed from the set.
Each part in the Meccano set is a single entity which may have 
a myriad different uses in the items constructed. A girder from 
the set, with 10 different holes, may be attached in one model 
only through its end holes, and the other eight holes not used, or 
redundant. In constructing another model four of the holes may be 
used, in another eight, and so forth. It is in analogous fashion 
that the speaker will make use of those aspects of a sememe that 
are relevant to the utterance and ignore the irrelevant aspects, 
thereby creating allosemes in discourse.
It follows that the child, in adding to the model being 
constructed, will decide on a suitable shape (sememe), which will 
be found realized in a particular piece or part (sign) of the set. 
Incorporating the part into the model, only certain particular 
aspects of the shape will be utilized, a factor which will 
consequently give it a role (alloseme) appropriate or distinctive 
to that model.
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It is obvious that the same piece plays different roles as 
(a) member of the set and (b) as member of a model. As member of 
the set (sememe) the possibilities of the part enter into contrast 
with the possibilities of all the other parts. As structural member 
of a model (alloseme) some of those possibilities will be realized: 
discourse results from the realization or actualization of some of 
the possibilities inherent in tongue. The structural member 
incorporated into the model then enters into contrast with the 
other elements (i.e. actualized possibilities) of the model.
Since the airplane and the other various models constructed 
from the set stand for sentences, for discourse, for parole. and 
the set of parts represents tongue, it is of interest to note that 
Saussure (1916:172) stated that the sentence is an element of parole 
not of langue. The sentence, like the model airplane, is the 
construct of an individual, not a communal property. The sememe, 
on the other hand, is communal property, is an element of langue. 
Or as Sapir (1921:14) puts it, 'Each element in the sentence defines 
a separate concept or conceptual relation or both combined, but 
the sentence as a whole has no conceptual significance whatever.' 
In short, a sentence carries a basic message but a message, being 
ephemeral, is not a concept, which is, by definition, durative. As 
I have shown elsewhere (Hewson 1978), it is easy to demonstrate 
that in terms of just propositional meaning alone, before there is 
any question of pragmatics (see 4.2 below), a single sentence such 
as Our sister fixed the board may have hundreds of different 
interpretations. To translate into Cree, for example, we would 
need to know whether the sister is older or younger, and whether 
she is also the sister of the addressee or not (i.e. the inclusive- 
/exclusive contrast); then there are the multitudinous variations 
offered by fix and board, which require specific terms in other 
languages.
4. Differences of Meaning
4.1 One Sememe or Two? The Non-uniqueness of Semantic Solutions
We have said that speakers of a language are normally aware of 
the meaning of a sentence spoken in a particular context, and that 
allosemes, or meanings in discourse are observable, since otherwise 
translation and paraphrase would be impossibilities. We must insist, 
however, that underlying meanings are not directly observable, but 
only inferrable through the varying usages of discourse. It follows 
that the linguist faces similar problems in trying to determine 
the underlying sememe that he faces in trying to establish phonemes 
from a phonetic transcription. With present methods of analysis,
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we cannot always be sure where there is overlapping and where there 
are different underlying sememes.
Our uncertainties over the boundaries of the underlying elements 
are never more unsure than when we are dealing with idiomatic usage. 
As a general rule, all surface usage that maintains at least one 
basic feature of the proposed or reconstructed sememe may be 
classified as unitary. We may assert with confidence that head 
has the same sememe in head of a man and head of a dog. Many would 
be quite content to add head of a pin and head of cabbage as other 
allosemes of the same basic sememe. But what are we to do with 
head of steam? Lexical meaning is an element that includes such 
extensive variation, and often such personal variation, that it is 
quite plausible that for some members of the English speaking 
community the î oun head in head of steam is an alloseme of the 
basic noun, whereas for others it has a totally separate underlying 
sememe. There is a need for more research and enquiry into some of 
the problems and issues here raised.
4.2 Context and Situation
When in the course of a day's activities we hear an ordinary 
simple sentence such as
12. He brought the paper.
we have no means of knowing through the linguistic information 
offered what kind of a paper was brought: the context does not 
define the alloseme. The alloseme may, however, be defined 
contextually:
13. He brought the paper to be signed.
14. He brought the daily paper.
15. He brought the paper he read at the conference.
In 13., the alloseme is document: in 14., it is newspaper. and in
15. it is scholarly communication.
The alloseme may likewise be determined purely pragmatically 
by the situation. If there is a directly observable referent, as 
when the individual is seen to be carrying either a newspaper or a 
document in his or her hand, any linguistic context is thereby made 
redundant, and the alloseme is determined by situation. This may 
also take place (although there is frequently room for ambiguity)
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when the situation includes a presupposition, as when we are 
expecting someone to arrive with a document. In that case, we 
would naturally suppose that the reference was to the document we 
were expecting.
4.3 Reference and the Referent
The term referent has traditionally been applied, following 
the positivist trend set by Ogden and Richards (1923:10) to an 
element of the experiential world that can be seen or touched. We 
shall call this the external referent. Ogden and Richards, in 
fact, attempted to reduce linguistic meaning to the relationship 
between what they called the symbol (that which vibrates on the 
air waves) and the external referent, thinking that they had thereby 
created an empirical science where each aspect of the relationship 
of meaning (symbol/referent) was directly observable. The result 
is, of course, pseudo-scientific reductionism, a theory that was 
very fashionable in its day, but totally unworkable: if I say
16. The table is one of humanity's oldest artefacts.
my interlocutor is entitled to ask 'What table? Show me.' It 
then becomes obvious that there is no external referent, that there 
is no directly observable table which will correspond to my reference 
in 16 .
A further complication arises from the fact that an external 
referent does not exist for a human observer until it has been 
registered as a percept. I can say, for example,
17. I am sitting on a chair as I write this sentence.
and any human observer can see that the chair in question is wooden, 
has no arms, and no cushion. If I then proceed to say
18. There is no one sitting on the other chair in this room.
when in fact there is no other chair in the room, the reference in
18. must be to a purely imaginary chair: there is no other chair,
and I know this because I have no mental perception of any other 
chair. Genuine external referents, in short, necessarily correspond 
to mental percepts; without such a mental percept, we conclude 
that there is no external referent. Alternatively, if I have a 
mental percept that others do not share, one concludes that I am 
hallucinating. It follows that the linguistic referent is 
necessarily the percept. or the memory of the percept, a mental
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entity, and not the external referent: otherwise one should be 
able to bypass the percept, the internal referent, and refer to 
the external referent directly, which, as we have seen, is 
impossible.
We are so used to taking it for granted that linguistic 
reference to the world of experience is direct and unmediated, 
that this point may be difficult to grasp, and the objection may 
be made that we are introducing an unnecessary layer or level of 
complication, adding considerably to the discomfort of those who, 
like Lyons, consider any discussion of the mind as somewhat 
disreputable. After all, if I point to the chair I am sitting in, 
I am not pointing to a percept, and indeed I am not sitting on a 
percept! The appropriate response to this objection is that it 
would be very foolish to attempt to sit down on something of which 
we had no percept: it is our perceptions of the world of experience 
which determine our knowledge of it: without the internal referent 
there can be no external referent.
Furthermore, I can not apply a mental label outside of the 
mind. If I am to label mentally the object I am sitting on as 
chair. as I have done in 17., such labelling can only be carried 
out on a percept or a memory. If I wish to put such a label on 
the physical chair, I must write chair on a label and attach it to 
the article in question: physical labelling must not be confused 
with mental labelling.
We must distinguish, therefore, between the internal referent, 
which is a percept or a memory, and the external referent of Ogden 
and Richards. The internal referent is, in fact, incorporated 
into the noun, and this is what distinguishes the noun as a part 
of speech: what is referred to by the noun is either a percept, a 
memory or a concept. The adjective, for example, brings its meaning 
to the noun on which it depends; in that sense it labels the 
noun: wooden chair. The referent of the adjective wooden is the 
noun chair. But what does the noun chair label? It labels the 
internal referent, the mental percept, which being thus labelled, 
becomes a part of the noun, and distinguishes the noun from other 
parts of speech, in that the referent of the noun is a part of the 
noun itself. The referent of the adjective and the verb is always 
elsewhere: in dog food, for example, the word dog does not have an 
internal referent; it refers to food, telling us what kind of food 
is involved. If I explain that it means food for dogs, then dogs 
does have an internal referent, which can of course be plural, and 
we note that food for dogs is dog food, not *dogs food: the 
adjectival form .of dog. since it has no internal referent, cannot 
have a plural.
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4.4 Sentential Reference
Recent years have seen renewed interest in linguistic universals 
and in the categorizing of certain features of languages as being 
universal properties of the phenomenon of language. Much interesting 
work has been done, but there has been a continuing tendency to 
entrammel significantly distinctive categories together and by so 
doing to over-simplify and thus 'universalize.'
One of the most obvious instances of reductionism, of 
over-simplification concerning linguistic meaning was the early 
assumption in Transformational Grammar that the active and passive 
forms of a sentence had the same 'deep structure' and consequently 
had the same 'meaning,' an assumption that has, of course, long 
been discarded. The number of sentences that have no satisfactory 
active or passive correlate are enough to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of such a view:
19. He was born a pauper.
20. Dogs make fine pets.
21. It measures five feet.
22. The presence of x means trouble.
23. He lost his parents in an automobile accident.
24. Few people read many books.
This problem is an instance of a regularly recurring confusion 
between the non-linguistic meaning of information on the one hand 
and linguistic meaning on the other. Where both active and passive 
forms of a sentence occur, it happens frequently that both may be 
used to refer to the same external situation; it is in reference 
that they are identical, not in linguistic meaning. Consequently, 
as with sentences 1. and 2., whether one uses French or English, 
active or passive, the referential meaning does not change: the 
situation referred to is the same.
That there is a difference of meaning between active and passive 
sentences may be clearly and simply demonstrated however. Without 
a given situational matrix a particular sentence may be 
multivariously ambiguous:
25. He missed his mother.
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For 25., we may propose the following situations: (i) he threw 
something; (ii) he had feelings about her absence; (iii) he went 
to meet her, but failed to contact her; (iv) he suddenly noticed 
her absence. The situations thus proposed (which in no way exhaust 
the possibilities) all resolve the ambiguity of the linguistic 
meaning of 25. We may now observe that the passive
26. His mother was missed by him.
may only be used in contexts (ii) and perhaps (iv). In short, the 
active and passive forms of this sentence present significantly 
different constructs; the passive form of this sentence is not 
ambiguous in the way that the active form is. This is not a 
surprising result: the passive is a marked form, and the marked 
form has normally a lesser scope than its corresponding unmarked 
form.
The confusion of different sentences that are supposed to have 
'the same meaning' is perpetuated in truth-conditional semantics 
as presented, for example in Kempson (1977:28ff). As Lyons has 
pointed out (1981:120-121) sentences with quite different thematic 
material
27. I have not read this book.
28. This book I have not read.
29. It is this book (that) I have not read.
30. This book has not been read by me.
may 'all have the same truth-conditions and therefore the same 
propositional content.' In the following pages he shows that other 
elements 'cannot be satisfactorily formalized within the framework 
of standard propositional logic' (p.141). Concerning questions, 
for example, he shows that traditional ways of formalizing them 
are hopelessly inadequate, and that the only way to deal with them 
in truth-conditional semantics is to identify them, semantically, 
with the set of declaratives. This, he comments, ' is hardly the 
approach that would be chosen by someone who was not determined, 
for metatheoretical reasons, to force the whole of sentence-meaning 
into a truth-conditional straightjacket' (1981:136).
There is much more to be said (although it is outside the 
scope of this article) on truth-conditional semantics. No one 
seems to have noticed, for example, that one has to know the meaning 
of a sentence before one can evaluate its truth conditions, and
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that to base sentence meaning on truth conditions is therefore to 
put the cart before the horse.
Since I have dealt elsewhere with the whole question of the 
propositional meaning of sentences (Hewson 1978), showing that 
what has the form of a single sentence may represent hundreds of 
different propositions, I shall make only one brief final comment 
here on the question of sentential reference. In the normal use 
of language, sentences belong to a time and place, to a context of 
situation, from which they can be abstracted only at the risk of 
distortion or misrepresentation. This is most obvious when one 
comes to translate: there is no way that the sentence I fixed the 
board can be translated into French unless one is informed about 
the situation in which the sentence is used. We are even entitled 
to wonder whether such a sentence has any meaning at all (apart 
from its individual lexical elements) if it has no context of 
situation.
6. Conclusions
The following main conclusions may be drawn: (1) Information 
is the relationship between an observable signal (a sense-daturn 
available to all, regardless of language) and the message it conveys. 
This relationship is two-way: the information is the conditioner 
of the signal, and the signal is the symptom of the information, 
and (2) there are three different aspects of linguistic meaning 
that have to be distinguished, namely underlying meaning, surface 
meaning, and reference.
Underlying meaning is that to be found in the permanent system 
of contrasts stored in the mind of the speaker at the subconscious 
level, out of awareness. The relationship is between morpheme and 
sememe, and it is a two-way relationship: each element is a reflex 
of the other. As Penfield showed, this reflex can be interrupted 
by the application of the neurosurgeon's electrode to certain areas 
of the cortex during surgery. Meaning at this level is not directly 
observable, but it is reconstructible from observation of the range 
of usage of each concept at the surface level, in discourse.
Surface meaning, in contrast to the permanent and subconscious 
nature of underlying meaning, is both temporary and conscious. 
Most surface meaning is recorded temporarily in the short term 
memory, and then forgotten. (The exceptions are those utterances 
that are written down or otherwise recorded for posterity). Surface 
meaning is the product of interaction within the collocation and 
within the context of situation, and consequently demonstrates a
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continuing capacity for variation, each temporal usage being very, 
often different from the one that precedes it and the one that 
follows it. The relation is between allomorph and alloseme, and 
it is also two-way, since it works for both speaker and hearer. 
The fact that such meaning is conscious and observable makes it 
possible to translate the message so presented into other languages.
Referential meaning is the relationship momentarily established 
(for purposes of communication, for example) between a linguistic 
sign-significate combination on the one hand and a mental percept 
or memory on the other. The purpose of reference is to convey 
information about the experiential universe. Reference, being 
intentional, is thereby unidirectional; were this not so, falsehood 
and lying would be impossible through the medium of language, since 
then the direct perception of experience would impose its own 
linguistic message. Referential meaning is the only aspect of 
linguistic meaning that is immediately concerned with truth values.
Information, if we may come full circle in our conclusions, is 
the distinctive (negentropic) form of our mental percepts (which 
they have whether they are referred to or not), and regardless of 
what language is used to name them. Such negentropic information 
is ultimately independent of language, but is nevertheless 
unquestionably exploited by human languages in the development of 
concepts. The whole question of the iconicity of language, that 
is, of how languages often directly reflect the negentropic 
information of the universe has in fact been pursued in recent 
years with very great interest (e.g. Haiman 1985). And the attempts 
of Anna Wierzbicka to determine semantic primitives (1972) and 
analyse conceptual systems (1980) is in turn based on very fine 
observation and discrimination of informational distinctions. 
Relating the conceptual distinctions of language to the informational 
patterns of experience is certainly a profitable avenue for semantic 
studies, and one that will undoubtedly be extensively investigated 
and exploited in the years ahead.
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